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 Introduction 
In industrialized countries, intellectual property rights (IPR) are part of the infrastruc-
ture supporting investments in research and development (R&D) leading to innovation. 
By granting temporary exclusive rights on inventions, IPR allow right-holders to price 
their products above marginal cost, and hence recoup their initial research investment. 
Such exclusive right creates incentives for the conduct of R&D. However, by granting 
monopoly rights on an invention, IPR impede its dissemination. The resulting under-
provision of protected goods and monopoly distortions are usually considered accept-
able costs for the creation of new knowledge and the increase in social welfare that it 
entails.  
In general, IPR are perceived as contributing to the promotion of technological innova-
tion and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, in a manner conducive to so-
cial and economic welfare (WTO-TRIPs Agreement, Art. 7). Still, growing numbers of 
experts question these affirmations for developing countries (LDCs) and argue that IPR 
“do little to stimulate innovation in developing countries” (CIPR, 2002: 1). IPR may 
provide an incentive for innovation but there is limited local capacity in LDCs to make 
use of it. Similarly, even if stronger IP protection supports an increase in technology 
transfer, limited local absorptive capability may constrain the potential to use it. Finally, 
the environment in which IPR exist, for example the quality of the legal system and the 
importance of transaction costs, might severely constrain the incentive effect, as has 
been concluded for Mexico (Léger, 2005). In these countries, the balance between dy-
namic benefits and static costs might not be positive. Still, IPR is an important issue in 
bilateral, regional and multilateral trade negotiations. Pressure is put on LDCs to sign up 
for stronger standards of IP protection without having a clear picture of the impacts IPR 
have in these economies (Fink and Maskus, 2005). 
  2This study hence investigates the role IPR play for innovation using a novel panel data-
set of LDCs and industrialized countries. In doing so it contributes to the innovation 
literature by comparing the determinants of innovation in developing and industrialized 
countries, and takes into account the cumulative nature of innovation by using dynamic 
panel estimation methods. Furthermore, it investigates the performances of different 
estimators for samples with small N and small T.  
We find that past R&D investments have a positive and significant impact on current 
innovation, demand-pull factors are also important in all country groups, and the struc-
ture of the economy has a negative (positive) impact in developing (industrialized) 
countries. Intellectual property protection is only significant (at a low level) for devel-
oping countries. The least-square dummy variable corrected estimator (Kiviet, 1995; 
Bruno, 2005a) is found to be the most appropriate for small, unbalanced datasets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 review the theoretical and em-
pirical literature on IPR and innovation. Section 3 presents the methodology and the 




Nature and Determinants 
The result of the innovation process is a new product (or process) as well as new infor-
mation, which has public good characteristics, i.e., non-rivalry and non-excludability. 
These two properties of information make the gains from innovation uncertain and dif-
ficult to appropriate, which implies that R&D opportunities that would be socially prof-
itable are not exploited because they are privately unprofitable. In order for innovation 
  3to be undertaken, incentives need to be given. IPR is suggested as one possible govern-
ment intervention to correct for this market failure
1. 
Three main reasons exist for innovation. First, the possibility of increased profits and 
market share, secured by IPR or other mechanisms (e.g. first-mover advantage, secrecy) 
motivates investments in innovative activity. Second, innovation would react to “de-
mand-pull” factors (Schmookler, 1966), i.e., the perceived demand for new products 
and processes. Conversely, “technology-push” factors, that are related to advancements 
in technology and science, would also play an important role (Cohen and Klepper, 
1996).  
The environment in which a firm operates affects its innovative performance. At the 
macroeconomic level, economic and political stability (Lall, 1992) provides an envi-
ronment supportive of innovation. Competition and openness to trade also affect incen-
tives to innovate, as does the structure of the economy, however these impacts are theo-
retically not clear (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). At the firm level, given that R&D is 
an expensive endeavor, cost of, and access to capital are important aspects. Finally, 
qualified scientists and workers are essential inputs into the innovation process, hence 
the level of human capital in the country is another important factor (Crespo et al, 
2004). 
Though innovation could play a crucial role for economic development in LDCs, most 
of the literature so far has focused on industrialized countries. However, a different 
treatment could be warranted given that LDC characteristics differ from the usual mod-
els. Demand-pull factors could have a limited impact in LDCs, given the generally 
lower purchasing power of inhabitants. Markets are often incomplete, weak or non-
                                                 
1 Others can include tax breaks on the performance of R&D, contests, R&D, or public performance of 
R&D. 
  4existent (Lall, 1992), which has important implications for the conduct of innovative 
activities, especially in areas such as capital (financial and human) and information. The 
institutional environment is characterized by the presence of high transaction costs, 
which often include corruption (Collier, 1998), and by weak institutions. These could 
affect the functioning of the market and the transmission of signals – e.g. demand for 
certain goods – to the innovators. Furthermore, the performance of IPR, a market-based 
tool, in malfunctioning markets, still has to be investigated. 
 
IPR in a North-South setting 
In a North-South setting, where only the North can innovate and the South has lower 
labor costs, Deardorff (1992) finds that stronger IPR hurt the South and benefit the 
North. Another study (Chin and Grossman, 1990) reaches similar conclusions, except 
for the case of highly productive R&D, for which international IP protection increases 
global welfare. There is however always a conflict of interest between the North and the 
South. Zigic (1998) extends this model to allow for different levels of IP protection and 
finds that this conflict holds when R&D efficiency is low, but that the interests could be 
in congruence for higher R&D efficiency levels. Similarly, in a model assuming differ-
ent preferences in the North and the South, strong IP protection in the South provides 
incentives for Northern innovation addressing Southern needs, hence benefiting both 
regions (Diwan and Rodrik, 1991). However purchasing power is not taken into ac-
count: Anecdotic evidence from the case of essential medicines in least-developed 
countries shows that strong IPR might not be enough for Northern R&D to take place. 
In a dynamic general equilibrium framework including imitation and technology trans-
fer, Helpman (1993) finds that strengthening IPR spurs innovation in the North in the 
short-run but slows it in the long run. The South also loses from stronger IPR, through a 
  5deterioration of its terms of trade, reallocation of production and a global slowdown of 
innovation. Conversely, a dynamic endogenous growth model (Saint-Paul, 2004) re-
veals that the South might lose more than the North from weak IPR, depending on the 
relative comparative advantages and the growth potential of the goods concerned. In 
general, the impact of stronger IPR on innovation is still unclear theoretically and heav-
ily depends on the models used and their underlying assumptions.  
 
Empirical Evidence 
A few studies examine the link between IP protection and innovation for panels of 
countries. Alfranca and Huffman (2003) use a panel of EU countries to estimate the 
effects of economic incentives and institutions on private innovation in agriculture, and 
find the level of IP protection, institutional quality, economic openness and the lagged 
value of agricultural production to be positive and significant factors. Conversely, inter-
est rate and the lagged value of crop production have (significant) negative impacts.  
Kanwar and Evenson (2003) investigate the determinants of innovation and technologi-
cal change, proxied by total R&D investments as a proportion of GNP. They obtain 
similar results: IP protection, credit availability, demand-pull factors, trade openness 
and human capital positively affect innovation, while political instability and interest 
rate would have a negative effect. They however do not consider the impact of past in-
novative activity, which is done by Lederman and Maloney (2003), who use a dynamic 
GMM estimator. They find that interest rate and risk negatively affect aggregate private 
and public R&D investments, while past R&D investments, credit market depth, IP pro-
tection, complementary institutions and the quality of research institutions are positive 
and significant explanatory factors. However, GMM estimators rely on asymptotic 
properties, hence estimates can be biased for small samples like their. Furthermore, they 
do not control explicitly for the level of development of the countries.  
  6A recent article (Higino Schneider, 2005) investigates the role of trade, FDI and IPR in 
explaining innovation and finds that, while IPR play a significant and positive role in 
industrialized countries, it is negative and not significant for LDCs, and is positive and 
significant for the whole sample. Contrary to the other studies, she uses the number of 
patent applications in the USA as a proxy for innovation. Since IP protection systems 
are relatively recent in LDCs, and that not all innovations qualify for patent protection, 
this measure might be imperfect for the study of innovation in LDCs. Furthermore, pat-
enting activity might be closely related to the structure of the economy, which is not 
controlled for. Finally, past innovative activity is not taken into account.  
The impact of IPR on innovation in LDCs is theoretically not clear, and the empirical 
evidence available indicates that it might be different for industrialized and developing 
countries. This article hence tests the propositions that: 
-  IPR protection is a significant factor affecting innovation; 
-  The determinants of innovation are different for developing and industrialized 
countries. 
It does so by using a new dataset of industrialized and developing countries. Finally, the 





I constructed a new panel dataset comprising 24 industrialized and 44 developing coun-
tries. I use average annual data for six 5-year sub-periods (1970-1995). Table 1 presents 
the variables used in the estimations, along with the expected signs of the parameters, 
and their sources.  
  7Innovation is proxied by total R&D expenditures as a proportion of GDP. IPR are ex-
pected to provide incentives for private R&D, but the classification of R&D tends to be 
between productive and non-productive sectors and these series are not stable over time. 
Moreover, working with aggregate R&D expenditures allows including more LDCs in 
the sample. Intellectual property protection is proxied by a time-varying index of IP 
protection that covers 5 categories of patent law: extent of coverage, membership in 
international agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms 
and the duration of protection
2 (see Park and Ginarte, 1997).  






    
Innovation  
 
  Total R&D expenditures as a proportion 
of GDP (5-year average) (RDGDP) 
UNESCO statistical yearbooks 









Gross domestic product (GDP) per cap-
ita (constant 2000 US$) (GDPPC) 
Population (latest year)  (POP) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) (World Bank, 2005) 
Technology-push 
factors 
+  Lagged R&D expenditures as a propor-





-   Inflation (INF)   WDI 2005 
Political instability  -   State failure events dummy (POL)   Constructed from State failure  
 task force 
Access to capital  +   Saving as a proportion of GDP (SAV)   WDI (2005) 
Cost of capital  -   Real interest rate (INTRATE)   WDI (2005)  
Competition 




 Openness to trade (OPEN) 
 Value-added in manufacturing as a pro 
 portion of GDP (MAN) 




+/-  Index of IP protection  (IP)   Park and Ginarte (1997), Park 
(2002) 
Human capital  +   Years of schooling, above 15 (EDU)   Barro-Lee data set (2000) 
 
Estimations are performed on three sub-samples: industrialized countries, developing 
countries and the whole sample (see table 2). Least-developed countries are underrepre-
                                                 
2 I would like to thank Walter Park for kindly making his dataset available. 
  8sented in this dataset: data are not available for the periods covered, which could bias 
the results. Table 3 presents the summary statistics. 
Table 2. Countries 
Developing Countries  Industrialized Countries 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic, 
Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indo-
nesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philip-
pines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Trini-
dad & Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA  
 





Total Sample  
(66) 
  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
RDGDP  0,104  0,347 1,451  0,749 0,666  0,865 
GDPPC  2450,12  2815,74  15 291  6 865  4 585,63  6 744,68 
POP  38 715  108 934  33 338  50 611  35 912  90 567 
INF  74,79  391,03 7,611  6,631 48,260  305,639 
POL  0,291  0,455 0,028  0,166 0,203  0,403 
SAV 17,546  10,411  24,259  5,253  19,898  10,237 
INTRATE 5,816  22,151  3,932  4,113 5,023  16,053 
OPEN 65,84  59,31  44,338  24,165  58,873  49,937 
MANUF 17,646  9,331  21,671  5,298  18,218  8,823 
IP  2,159  0,727 3,201  0,659 2,523  0,844 
EDU  4,347  2,035 7,897  2,104 4,617  2,776 
 
Estimation 
Given the theoretical importance of technology-push factors, the past investments in 
R&D as a proportion of GDP, i.e., the lagged dependent variable, is used as a regressor. 
This introduction generates a dynamic relationship for countries (i) over time (t) of the 
type         i = 1, …, N and t = 2, …, T       where α is a scalar,   
is 1 x K and β is K x 1. The error component  is uit = ηi + vit where E[ηi] = 0, E[vit], 
E[vit ηi] = 0 for i = 1, …, N and t = 2, …, T. The vit  are assumed to be serially uncorre-
lated E[vit vis] = 0 for i = 1, …, N and s ≠ t.  
,
'
1 , it it t i it u x y y + + = − β α
'
it x
Some problems arise from the introduction of the lagged variable on the right-hand-
side. Since yit is a function of ηi, yi t-1 is also a function of ηi, causing a correlation be-
tween a regressor and the error term. This renders the OLS estimator inconsistent and 
  9biased (upwards). Estimation using fixed effects (FE) eliminates the inconsistency by 
eliminating ηi. However, for panels with small T, this induces a correlation between the 
transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term, which causes the 
fixed effects estimator to be biased (downwards). The estimates of α obtained with these 
two methods can however be used as boundaries to control for misspecification or in-
consistency in other models.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a generalized method of moments (GMM) proce-
dure where they use orthogonality conditions between yi, t-1  and the disturbance vit to 
obtain supplementary instruments, which yields a consistent estimator. Other authors 
(eg. Blundell and Bond, 1998, hereafter BB) have since found that weak instruments 
could cause large finite sample biases, especially when time series are persistent and the 
number of series observations is small. They proposed a system GMM estimator using 
equations in differences and in levels to bring additional moment conditions and in-
crease efficiency. Such estimation procedure is adequate for panels with large N and 
small T since it relies on asymptotic properties. Windmeijer (2005) hence developed a 
correction for the two-step covariance matrix that significantly increases the efficiency 
of these GMM estimators, that is implemented here.  
Comparing these different estimators, Judson and Owen (1999) and Adolph et al (2005) 
found the Least-Squares Dummy Variable Corrected estimator (LSDVC), originally 
proposed by Kiviet (1995) and recently extended by Bruno (2005a, 2005b) to the case 
of unbalanced panels, to be the most efficient and less biased. However, while taking 
care of the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, the LSDVC estimator as-
sumes strict exogeneity of the other regressors. Another possible estimator to deal with 
small sample bias is the limited information maximum likelihood estimator (LIML), 
which has been found in such conditions to be superior to GMM estimators (Alvarez 
  10and Arellano, 2003). It is robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and, contrary to 
LSDVC, it allows for the presence of right-hand-side endogenous variables.  
 
Results and Analysis 
Estimation Results 
Estimations are performed using Stata8, and all variables are estimated in logs
3. Tests 
indicate the presence of first-order autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity: The GMM 
regressions are hence estimated using the two-step estimator. Given the small T, tests 
for equality of slopes across groups could not be performed. Table 4 presents the esti-
mation results for the different models and sub-samples.  
As was already mentioned, OLS produces an estimate of α that is biased upwards, and 
FE α  is biased downwards, hence an unbiased estimate should lie in this interval.  BB α  is 
however consistently outside these boundaries: the GMM system estimator relies on 
asymptotic properties and even though the Windmeijer finite sample correction adjusts 
the variance-covariance matrix for small samples, it does not correct the bias of the es-
timates. Similarly,  LIML α  is very small in comparison with the other estimates. Even 
though it has been found less biased than FE and GMM estimators in simulations, its 
performance for unbalanced datasets appears to be poor. Even though the bias of 
LSDVC estimates also tends to increase with the degree of unbalancedness of the data-
set (Bruno, 2005b), these results are theoretically more reliable. Hence the results of the 
different estimations are presented but only the LSDVC results will be discussed for 
interpretative purposes.   
                                                 
3 Different user-developed programs are used: Roodman (2005) for the GMM estimations, Bruno (2005b) 
for the LSDVC estimations, and Schaffer (2006) for LIML. 
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Table 4. Estimation Results  
Variables 
 
Developing Countries  Industrialized Countries  Total Sample 
  OLS                              FE LSDVC
 
BB LIML OLS FE LSDVC BB LIML OLS FE LSDVC BB LIML




























































EDU 0,282  -0,298 














































































































- -0,317  -0,885** 






























































































































-                        - - - 188,11 
(0,000) 
- - - - 90,17 
(0,000) 
















Countries                                35 35 35 35 32 21 21 21 21 24 55 55 55 55 47
Observations                                201 201 201 181 134 61 61 61 61 110 261 261 261 241 178
Note:   Significant at the 1% level:* **, 5%: **, 10%: *.  Standard errors in parentheses.   
 
 For all models, the F-tests show that the parameters are jointly significant. Following 
expectations,  OLS α  >  FE α  for the full sample as well as for the sub-sample of indus-
trialized countries, but for the developing countries sub-sample  FE α  >  OLS α . Even 
though  LSDVC α  is not located in the interval for full sample and the developing coun-
tries sub-samples, it is slightly above the upper-bound ( OLS α ) which could indicate an 
upward bias. For all samples α is positive and strongly significant, which supports the 
hypothesis of the cumulative nature of innovation.  
We are especially interested in the IP index, however it is significant (at the 10% le-
vel) only in the regression for LDCs. This could be explained by the high level of cor-
relation between the IPR index and other variables in the estimations, see table 5 for 
some of the correlations. The correlation between IPR and lagged R&D is high and 
significant for industrialized countries and the full sample, however it is low and in-
significant for the LDCs sub-sample.   
Table 5. Correlations for IPR 
IPR and..  LDC 
 
DC Total  sample 
L_RD  0,0619  0,6419 *  0,6048 * 
EDU  0,3263 *  0,4052 *  0,5904 * 
GDPCAP  0,3161 *  0,5473 *  0,6500 * 
POP  -0,1837 *  0,4500 *  -0,0633 
OPEN  0,2010 *  0,1390  0,0187 
MANUF  -0,1099 -0,0032  0,0466 
Note: * significant at the 5% level 
 
Looking at the correlation between IPR and openness to trade, that is significant for 
LDCs but not for the two other samples, could help explaining the strengthening of 
IPR in these different groups. In industrialized countries, IPR were strengthened to 
protect inventions, while in LDCs strengthening took place to comply with interna-
tional trade agreements, as was observed in Latin American countries (Jaffé and van 
Wijk, 1995). This however raises the question of the possible endogeneity of the IPR variable. Wu-Hausman F-tests of endogeneity however show that none of the regres-
sors (apart from the lagged dependent variable) are endogenous.  
Value-added in manufacturing, which is used to account for the structure of the econ-
omy, is negative and significant for the full sample as well as for the LDCs sub-
sample, while it is also significant but positive for industrialized countries. Theoreti-
cally, the sign of the relationship is not clear: as formal R&D mainly leads to techno-
logical innovations, that are then used in manufacturing, one would expect that coun-
tries where manufacturing is an important sector of the economy would be more inno-
vative, as is the case in the sub-sample of industrialized countries. However, this vari-
able is highly correlated with other variables that could be considered indicators of 
development (education, GDP per capita, quality of the institutions, and the dummy 
for developing country status), hence in the case of developing countries the negative 
sign could relate to this relationship rather than to the impact of the structure of the 
economy.  
Finally, the demand-pull hypothesis, reflected by the variables GDP per capita and 
population, is supported in all sub-samples: population is positive and significant (at 
the 10% level) in LDCs and in the full sample (at the 1% level), whereas GDP per 
capita is positive and strongly significant in industrialized countries. The lower levels 
of R&D in developing countries appear not to respond to the purchasing power of the 
local market. Given that we are working with aggregated R&D expenditures, it could 
also be that most of the R&D expenditures in LDCs come from the government and 
hence do not respond to perceived market demand but rather to strategic priorities.  
 
 
  14Discussion 
These results suggest that innovation, in both developing and industrialized countries, 
strongly depends on past R&D investments, the so-called technology push factors, 
and more importantly so in industrialized countries. This could be due to the fact that 
in most industrialized countries, firms and research institutes have a higher level of 
technological capabilities and hence benefit from advances in science pushing further 
the technological frontier, i.e., domestic investments and investments from other in-
dustrialized countries. Conversely, the level of technological capabilities amongst 
firms and research institutes in LDCs is in general lower (or more heterogeneous), and 
these have access to spillovers from the R&D activities in industrialized countries, 
and the role of domestic investments would hence not be as important. This is sup-
ported by empirical evidence that R&D spillovers are especially important when 
countries are trading with countries with higher technological capabilities (Coe, 
Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1997).  
Similarly, in industrialized countries the demand-pull factors (as proxied by GDP per 
capita) play an important role, but not in LDCs, where population is positive and sig-
nificant. In the same line of though as the discussion on the technology-push factors, 
demand for innovation in LDCs can be satisfied from several sources – domestic and 
foreign – while the demand for a variety of differentiated products, adapted to the 
local conditions, is more important in industrialized countries, which might explain 
this situation. Another explanation would be that the characteristics of the markets in 
LDCs (high transaction costs) impair the transmission, and hence the impact, of de-
mand for innovation.  
These results are consistent with those of previous studies discussed in section 2. 
However, the number of significant parameters is a lot higher in these other studies, 
  15and the estimation methods differ: Kanwar and Evenson use OLS on the equation in 
logarithmic form, in a static model (not including past R&D investments), ignoring 
the potential role of technology-push factors on innovation, which are here found to 
be important. On the other hand, Lederman and Maloney use the GMM system esti-
mator, which is expected to yield consistent estimators for panels with large N and 
small T, without correcting for the small sample bias, which causes the standard errors 
to be underestimated (Windmeijer, 2005). Furthermore, they chose to estimate certain 
variables in logarithmic form where the interpretation of the results becomes prob-
lematic and contrary to standard procedures, e.g., estimating most variables in levels 
but the IP index in logarithmic form. Even though Kanwar and Evenson (2003) look 
at the determinants of private R&D and Lederman and Maloney (2003) use aggregate 
R&D, they obtain similar results.  
 
Estimation issues 
The availability of data is problematic, especially for LDCs, which caused several 
countries to be excluded from the samples. There might hence be a selection bias, 
since the countries for which data are available possess a certain level of institutional 
capacity. This de facto eliminates countries with lower levels of institutional capacity 
and takes away some of the variability, and hence representativity of the sample, 
which in turn affects the quality of the estimates.  
However, data for these countries are not available, to such an extent that taking the 
bias into account in the estimations, using for example a Heckman selection model, 
was impossible. It is important to keep this qualification in mind, even though the 
information obtained on the more advanced LDCs, especially compared with the case 
  16of industrialized countries, also provides useful insights for policy-making in coun-
tries at lower levels of development.  
The empirical analysis of small, unbalanced samples is problematic. While the LIML 
estimator has been found to have a small bias in Monte Carlo simulations, its per-
formance with the datasets at stake is poor. Test results and statistics of the model 
were satisfactory
4 but the estimates are obviously biased, for all sub-samples. The 
LSDVC yields a better performance but is also biased, which is consistent with evi-
dence from simulations (Bruno, 2005b), where the bias was found to increase with the 
degree of unbalencedness of the dataset. 
Another important point relates to the collinearity among right-hand-side regressors. 
Table 6 shows the pairwise correlations among the variables used in the estimations 
and makes clear that they are all interdependent. Even though panel estimations re-
duces the problem of collinearity among regressors, it still affects the quality of the 
estimates and especially the interpretation of results.  
Table 6. Pairwise Correlations – Full Sample 
  L_RDGDP  IPR  EDU GDPCAP  POP SAV 
L_RDGDP 1           
IPR 0,5986*  1         
EDU 0,5975*  0,3928*  1       
GDPCAP  0,7103*  0,5282*  0,7706*  1   
POP 0,2268*  0,0025  -0,0040  -0,0950*  1   
SAV 0,2577*  0,1406*  0,5047*  0,4780*  0,0904  1 
MAN 0,2840*  0,0514  0,6041*  0,5355*  0,0445  0,3419* 
Note: in logs, *: significant at the 5% level 
Finally, innovation is inherently difficult to define and to measure. Definitions vary 
among sources: the systems of innovation literature stays close to Schumpeter’s “new 
combinations” by defining innovation as “a new use of pre-existing possibilities and 
                                                 
4 Since the LIML regressions were not discussed, details of the instrumental variables and first-stage 
statistics are not reported but are available from the author upon request. 
  17components” (Lundvall, 1992, p.8) while the OECD (1997) defines it as all the scien-
tific, technological, organizational, financial, and commercial activities necessary to 
create, implement, and market new or improved products or processes (1997). Meas-
uring innovation implies focusing on its more technical aspects, and though this issue 
has been discussed in the literature (see for example Griliches, 1994; Stern et al, 
2000) the conclusion is that no perfect measure is available. This problem might be 
even more relevant for the case of developing countries, where innovation consists 
more of learning, adaptation and imitation, which again would call for a different 
treatment. However, given the importance of these issues for economic theory and 
policy, these qualifications should be kept in mind while more efforts and resources 
should be directed toward solving data and definition problems.  
 
Conclusion  
This paper identifies the determinants of innovation using a panel of developing and 
industrialized countries, applying different panel estimation methods to the case of 
panels with small N and T. Previous investments in R&D are found to be an important 
factor explaining private R&D investments, in both samples, while demand-pull fac-
tors (GDP per capita) play a role in industrialized countries but not in developing 
countries, human capital is positive and significant only in the full sample.  
Even though the LSDVC estimator has been found to be most efficient and less biased 
than other estimators in Monte Carlo simulations, its bias increases with the degree of 
unbalancedness of the dataset. Another econometric issue relates to the high correla-
tion among regressors, which makes the interpretation of the coefficients difficult and 
potentially affects the significance of the variables. Finally, the availability of data is 
problematic, and further efforts should be devoted to the collection of adequate data.  
  18Given the importance of innovation for economic growth and development, the study 
of the innovation process in developing countries warrants more attention, and the 
results presented here underline the need to control for the level of development of 
look more specifically at the case of developing countries, as determinants of innova-
tion could differ according to the level of development.  
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